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gage as an interest in land after the debt is barred, the court can-
not help but adopt the rule in effect in the majority of jurisdictions,
which seems more just and equitable.
ROBERT S. HAMMOND
CHARACTER OF DECEASED AND UNCOMMUNICATED
THREATS BY DECEASED IN HOMICIDE CASES
As a general rule, evidence of the violent and dangerous charac-
ter of the deceased is inadmissible in homicide cases.' This rule is
predicated upon the fact that the wicked as well as the good are
entitled to the protection of the law, and that it in no degree excuses
the taking of human life that the person slam was of bad character
or reputation. However, an exception to the general rule exists
in cases where the defendant admits the killing but claims to have
acted in self defense. Here the character of the deceased is ma-
terial for two purposes: first, to show the state of mind of the
accused as a cause of his action at the time of the killing, and sec-
ond, to aid in determining which party was the aggressor.
When one charged with murder asserts that he killed in self
defense, Is state of mind is a material factor as to the existence
and reasonableness of apprehension of such violence by the de-
ceased as to justify the defensive measures adopted by the defend-
ant. The law recognizes the fact that men assailed defend them-
selves with alacrity and force in proportion to the violent and
dangerous character of their assailants It follows that an act of
the decedent which, if considered independently of his character
would not be sufficient to warrant extreme defensive measures,
might, when observed and considered in connection with such char-
acter, arouse a belief of imminent peril, thereby 3ustifymg the de-
fensive measures adopted.
In order for the accused to prove his state of mind and thereby
show the reasonableness of his action by the introduction of evi-
dence of the deceased's turbulent character, it is necessary that
the accused first show that he had knowledge of such character
prior to the killing.' A failure to prove prior knowledge would
completely defeat the purpose for which this evidence is admitted.
It has been held in at least one case that such knowledge may be
presumed
The second purpose for which evidence of the violent character
of the deceased is admitted is to determine whether it was the
accused or the deceased who provoked the assault. In this situation
'Lang v. Ala., 84 Ala. 1, 4 So. 193 (1888), 13 R.C.L. Homicide,
See. 219.2 Gardner v. State, 90 Ga. 310, 17 S.E. 86 (1892).3Karr v. State, 100 Ala. 4, 14 So. 851 (1894)
'Sturgeon v. Commonwealth, 31 K.L.R. 536, 102 S.W 812 (1907).
'Trabune v. Commonwealth, 13 K.L.R. 343, 17 S.W 186 (1891).
STUDENT NOTE S
it is immaterial that the accused had no knowledge of the de-
ceased's character prior to the killing.' Where it clearly appears
that the defendant was the aggressor this evidence is not admis-
sible.7 The chief objection8 to the admissibility of evidence for
this second purpose is that the jury is presented with the bad char-
acter of the deceased only since similar character of the accused
cannot be shown unless he first introduces evidence of his good
character.
Evidence of the bad character of a third person who was with
the deceased at the time of the killing is permitted in order to prove
that action by such third party in conjunction with action by the
deceased forced the accused to resort to self defense, thereby re-
lieving the accused of the charge of having provoked the assault.'
A question closely associated with the admissibility of evidence
of the deceased's character is that of uncommunicated threats made
by the deceased against the defendant. Such evidence has been
admitted to prove which party provoked the assault," the state of
mind of the deceased" and to corroborate threats which were com-
muicated to the defendant prior to the killing."
Due to the fact that the threat was not brought to the knowl-
edge of the defendant it cannot be relevant to the defendant's state
of mind at the time of the killing. The threat is, however, probative
of the state of mind of the person making it' and if this state of
mind embodies a plan or intention to attack the defendant then
it is ultimately probative of the actual consummation of such an
attack.' Knowledge by the defendant of uncommunicated threats
is not a necessary prerequisite to their introduction for the purpose
of showing the deceased's state of mind." And, as in the analogous
situation where it is sought to introduce evidence of deceased's
violent character, it is reasoned that accused's lack of knowledge
of the threat does not prevent its adrmssibility as bearing on the
question of who provoked the assault.
'McLain v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 373, 188 S.W 377 (1916)
'Morrison v. Commonwealth, 24 K.L.R. 2493, 74 S.W 277 (1903)
'State v. Padula, 106 Conn. 454, 138 At. 456 (1927)
'Magan v. Commonwealth, 119 S.W 734 (Ky. 1909).
" Miller v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 818, 45 S.W (2d) 461 (1932),
Paton v. Commonwealth, 235 Ky. 845, 32 S.W (2d) 405 (1930)
Colson v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 402, 255 S.W 60 (1923), Jones
v. Commonwealth, 191 Ky. 485, 231 S.W 31 (1921), Newton v
Commonwealth, 31 K.L.R. 327, 102 S.W 264 (1907), miller v. Com-
monwealth, 89 Ky. 653, 10 S.W 137 (1888).
uHargis v. Commonwealth, 135 Ky. 578, 123 S.W 239 (1909)
"Cornelius v. Commonwealth, 54 Ky (15 B. Mon.) 432 (1855)
State v. Evans, 33 W Va. 426, 10 S.E. 792 (1890).
"Cornelius v. Commonwealth, 54 Ky. (15 B. Mon.) 432, 437
(1855) cited supra note 13.
Hargis v. Commonwealth, 135 .Ky. 578, 123 S.W 239 (1909)
cited supra note 12.
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The third basis for the admissibility of uncommunicated threats
is to confirm and corroborate evidence that certain communicated
threats were made against the defendant ' and to counteract any
presumption of fabrication by the witnesses who gave the testimony.
The law on these subjects is well settled in this jurisdiction
and appears to the writer to conform with logic and justice.
HENRY H. BRAMBLET
A CRITIQUE OF THE TEST OF INSANITY IN CRlVIINAL
CASES IN KENTUCKY
Until 1843, the date of M'Naughten's Case,' no attempt had been
made to state an all inclusive test for insanity If one consults the
six or seven more important historical cases arising before 1843,2
it will be seen that instead of the court tendering to the jury a
test for the degree of insanity necessary to render the defendant
incapable of formulating the intent required for the particular crime,
it has, in each case, given examples or illustrations from or by which
the jury might be enabled to arrive at the proper verdict in that
particular, case.
The M'Naughten Case, however, proposed a concise, inclusive
test for crimial irresponsibility by reason of insanity The tests
or rules connected with this case were propounded by the judges of
England at the request of the House of Lords and presumably were
the law of England at that time as they have proved to be since.
The tests were actually in regard to two main topics, delusional
.insanity and ordinary insanity. The test proposed for ordinary
insanity was as follows: "to establish a defense on the ground of
insanity, it must be clearly proved, that at the time of the act, the
accused was laboring under such a defect of reasoning as not to
know the nature and quality of his act, or, if he did, that he did
not know that what he was doing was wrong." In explaining what
was meant by "wrong," it was said that if the accused was con-
scious that the act was one that he ought not to do, and if it was
at the same time contrary to the law of the land, it would be pun-
ishable. Therefore it would seem that the tendency to place the
greater significance upon the legal rather than the moral wrong,
as was done in the two previous cases, was overruled.'
"1Kramer v. Commonwealth, 8 Ky Op. 428 (1875)
'10 Clark and Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep., 718 (1843)
'Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695, 764 (1724), Earl Ferrer's
Case, 19 How. St. Tr. 886, 948 (1760), Hadfield's Case, 27 How.
St. Tr. 1282 (1800), Bellingham's Case, Collinson's Cases on Lunacy
636, as cited by GLUEcK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CiinVINAL LAW
(1925) at 149 (about 1812), Offord's Case, 5 Car. and P 168, 172
Eng. Rep. 924 (1831), Regina v. Oxford, 9 Car. and P 525, 546,
173 Eng. Rep. 941 (1840).
3 Regina v. Oxford, 9.Car. and P 525, 173 Eng. Rep. 941 (1840),
Offord's Case, 5 Car. and P 168, 172 Eng. Rep. 924 (1831)
